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Native-immigrant wage di¤erentials and occupational
segregation in the Greek labour market
Abstract
This paper explores native-immigrant wage di¤erentials in the Greek
labour market. Data from the most recent Greek Household Budget Sur-
vey (2004-05) were employed, four alternative occupational categories were
considered and occupational choice was explicitly modelled. Controlling for
occupational selectivity, occupation-specic wage regressions for representa-
tive samples of employed native and immigrant workers were estimated and
an augmented decomposition technique was utilized to analyze inter and in-
tra occupation wage di¤erentials. The obtained results demonstrate that
roughly 48 per cent of the average wage di¤erential can not be explained by
di¤erences in observed characteristics and that the larger component of this
unexplained part is due to asymmetrical occupational access by native and
immigrant workers.
Keywords: wage di¤erentials, immigration, occupational selectivity,
Greece.
JEL Codes: J31, J61, O52
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1 Introduction
In the beginning of the 1990s and following the collapse of the communist
regimes in Eastern Europe, Greece has experienced a massive inux of illegal
immigrants (e.g., Angrist and Kugler, 2003). The country had no previous
experience on the receiving endof immigration ows and she was unpre-
pared to deal e¤ectively with this new phenomenon. Even today, more than
15 years since the rst immigrants arrived, Greece lacks an integrated and
coherent immigration policy. And this despite the fact that immigrants com-
prise a signicant minority of Greeces population (7-10%) and labor force
(5-10%) and an important part of Greek economic, social and cultural life
(OECD, 2005). The integration of immigrants into the Greek economy and
society is nowadays a major political issue that arouses heated public discus-
sions. In this paper we investigate only one facet of economic integration,
namely the native-immigrant wage di¤erential1. Borjas (1990) argues that
the existence of a positive native-immigrant wage gap does not necessarily
mean that immigrant labour is cheaper but that this di¤erential could arise
if there were systematic labour market discrimination against foreign-born
workers. Using data from the most recent Greek Household Budget Survey
(GHBS) we identify the group of immigrants, according to their country of
birth and compare their wages to native Greeks. Typical wage generating
functions are estimated and suitable decomposition techniques are applied.
Selectivity issues with respect to the apparently important occupational seg-
regation are also addressed. This, to our knowledge, is the rst micro-level
study of native-immigrant wages in Greece that employs nationally represen-
tative cross-sectional data.
The existing literature on the economic aspects of immigration in Greece
is rather limited. The newness of the phenomenon and the lack of reliable
nation-wide micro data bases have limited its investigation to descriptive ag-
gregate macro-level analysis and a few case studies. Glytsos (1995) presented
demographic data for four groups of immigrants and described the related
policy framework adopted and applied by the Greek government. Lianos et
al. (1996) utilized sample data for 4 prefectures of Northern Greece and
concluded that illegal immigrant wages are 40-60 per cent lower than native
ones and that immigrants are mostly employed in occupations forsaken by
Greeks. Markova and Sarris (1997) concentrated on illegal Bulgarian im-
migrants and examined entry conditions, sectors of employment, living and
working conditions as well as their relations to natives and local authorities.
1Borjas, (1999) describes economic assimilation (or, integration) as the process of hu-
man capital accumulation that narrows the native-immigrant wage gap.
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The study of Sarris and Zographakis (1999) employed a theoretical and em-
pirical approach regarding the e¤ects of illegal migration in Greece. They
utilized a small CGE model and reached the conclusion that immigration
exerts a detrimental e¤ect on the wages of unskilled labor and a positive
e¤ect on the wages of skilled workers. In the process, they assumed a at
immigrantnative wage di¤erential of 40 per cent and that all immigrants
o¤er unskilled work. Lianos and Papakonstantinou (2003) investigated the
demographic characteristics of immigrants, their regional distribution and
employment status and explored the impact of immigrants on the employ-
ment of Greeks, using aggregate data from three distinct Greek statistical
sources. Kasimis and Papadopoulos (2005) focused on immigrants employed
in Greek agriculture and described their impact on farm operations and local
labor markets. Finally, Rovolis and Tragaki, (2006) examined the geograph-
ical distribution of immigrants in Greece and identied disparities between
di¤erent ethnic groups with regard to their educational level and occupa-
tional characteristics.
A preliminary inspection of the GHBS data base reveals that indeed
foreign-born individuals comprise an important minority, which comes to 7.8
per cent of Greeces population. The share of immigrants from former com-
munist Eastern European Countries (EEC) comes to a notable 73.5 per cent,
from Asia, Africa and the Middle East (AAME) to 11.1 per cent, from EU-15
to 8.2 per cent, and from Other Countries- Americas and Oceania- (OC) to
7.2 per cent. The relative importance of the EEC group is profound and it
is worth pointing out that roughly 47 per cent of all immigrants in Greece
come from Albania. Furthermore and with regard to their employment sta-
tus, primeage immigrants, in the [18-64] age category, exhibit substantially
higher labor force participation rates than native Greeks (60.97 per cent),
especially those from EEC and AAME (70.95 and 70.69, respectively). This
nding holds particularly for male immigrants in these groups, who record
participation rates almost 12 percentage points higher than natives (see Ta-
bles 1 and 2). Figure 1 depicts the densities of observed (ln) hourly wages for
native Greeks and two immigrant groups (EEC and AAME+EU-15+OC).
We observe that the densities of immigrant wages, those for the EEC block
in particular, show greater concentration around their mean, which is clearly
lower than the average native wage. Thus, prima facie, the observed wage
di¤erentials seem to corroborate the commonly held view that immigrants
are discriminated against in the Greek labour market, as far as labor earnings
are concerned.
Insert Table 1 about here
Insert Table 2 about here
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Insert Figure 1 about here
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the
sources and the descriptive statistics of the key variables for the two groups
of interest, i.e., natives and immigrants. We also perform a basic background
analysis of observed wage di¤erentials and present the results of routine de-
composition exercises. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology that
deals explicitly with occupational choice. The issue of discriminatory prac-
tices, as they relate to the occupational distribution of immigrants and an
augmented version of the typical Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique,
that incorporates occupational segregation, are also presented in this section.
Section 4 presents and discusses the estimation results. The paper concludes
with a summary of the basic ndings, policy implications and suggestions for
further research.
2 Data and background analysis
Our analysis uses data collected in the GHBS, a nationally representative
sample of some 6,555 households, containing approximately 17,386 persons
and covering the period February/2004-January/20052. The survey question-
naire draws information about immigrant and labour market status, gender,
marital status, region of residence, income and earnings, hours of work, job
and family characteristics, education, sector of employment, occupations,
housing tenure and conditions, etc. We extracted data for prime-age individ-
uals, i.e., in the 18-64 age bracket and excluded retirees, students, military
personnel and self employed. The latter category was excluded because, as a
rule, self-employed do not report earnings, when they do they tend to under-
report them and furthermore, reported income by the self-employed includes
returns to capital as well. Finally, we constructed an hourly wage measure
for natives and immigrants from data on monthly earnings and weekly hours
of work. The estimating sample comes to a total of 6273 individuals of which
897 are immigrants. The employment rate of the selected sample is 68.1 per
cent, i.e., 4274 individuals.
Table 3 presents sample statistics for the major correlates, for the whole
sample and separately for the immigrant and native sub-samples. We observe
that the average native wage is higher than the immigrant wage by 39.8 per-
cent. It is worth noticing that 87.6 per cent of employed immigrants work
in the private sector (vs. 62.1 per cent for the native population), that the
2Typically, related empirical studies use Census datasets. However, in Greece, primary
Census data are not publicly available to researchers.
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percentage of uninsured immigrants is substantially higher than the native
one, that the share of immigrants holding temporary jobs is also higher and,
nally, that immigrants are primarily employed as unskilled workers, craft
and related workersand service and shop-sales workers3. In contrast, na-
tives are employed mainly as clerks, service and shop-sales workers, craft
and related workersand professionals. Overall, we observe that with regard
to demographic characteristics the two groups do not di¤er substantially. Sig-
nicant di¤erences appear to exist however with regard to job characteristics
and occupations. With regard to the latter, we have calculated a congruence
index, as suggested by Welch (1999) and Borjas (2003), as an indicator of
the degree of similarity in the occupational distributions of immigrants and
natives4. The calculated value of the index turned out to be equal to minus
one, a nding that suggests clustering of immigrants and natives in di¤erent
occupations.
Insert Table 3 about here
In general, native-immigrant wage di¤erentials are investigated within
the human capital paradigm (e.g., Long, 1980; Kee, 1985; Coulon, 2003).
Typical Mincerian wage generating functions are estimated rst for the two
sub-samples (Mincer, 1974; Chiswick, 1978) and a typical Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition analysis is performed in the second stage (e.g., Reimers, 1983;
Kee, 1985; Darity et al., 1995; Butcher and Dinardo, 2002). The advantage
of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is that it breaks up and measures the
contribution of observable characteristics to the estimated average wage dif-
ferential. As a starting point and for comparison purposes we follow this
typical approach.
Table 4 presents the estimated coe¢ cients of the immigrant dummy
variable for three alternative wage-generating model specications5. The
typical Mincerian wage-generating function, corrected for sample selection,
3Borjas (1999) argues that the entrance of immigrants in non-traditional occupations
in the host country constitutes a source of faster economic assimilation.
4The index takes the value of one when the two groups have identical occupation
distributions and minus one when they are clustered in completely di¤erent occupations.
5Following the empirical tradition of Chiswick (1978), we estimate rst a typical hu-
man capital earnings function using the pooled sample, i.e., immigrants and natives. An
indicator variable for immigrant status is included as an additional argument. Borjas
(1985) extended this empirical model by including controls for plausible cohort e¤ects and
his fully-specied model incorporates assimilation, cohort and period e¤ects. However, in-
formation on years of residencein Greece and years since migrationare not available in
the GHBS data base and thus, are not included in the present application. Nevertheless, it
appears that the basic human capital model explains adequately the earnings distribution
of workers in the Greek labour market.
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constitutes the base-line specication (column 1)6. Twelve regional and 16
sector-of- employment dummies are included as additional arguments in the
second specication (column 2). The third specication includes in addi-
tion eight occupational dummies (column 3). We observe that the estimated
coe¢ cient of immigration on wages is negative and statistically signicant
across all model specications, while sample selection with regard to partic-
ipation appears to be present. The selectivity criterion lambda is negative
and statistically signicant, indicating that wages of participants are esti-
mated to be lower than those of non-participants who have the same values
of the exogenous variables. Notice also that the e¤ect of immigration on
wages is substantially reduced when we control for occupations, from -0.12
(2nd specication) to -0.07 (3rd specication). This nding demonstrates that
immigration may correlate with certain occupations.
Typical Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the estimated wage di¤eren-
tials for the three model specications are presented at the bottom of Table
4. The wage di¤erentials were estimated from separate estimations of na-
tive and immigrant wage generating functions. The obtained decomposition
results are quite appealing. The predicted wage di¤erential is higher than
the observed raw wage di¤erential between natives and immigrants, across
the three specications, indicating that non-participants have higher reser-
vation wages than participants. Thus, if non-participants were to become
participants then the required increase in o¤ered wages would have resulted
in an increase in the estimated native-immigrant wage di¤erential. However,
this wage gap is reduced substantially when the wage equation is controlled
for regional, sectoral and occupational di¤erences. We observe for example
that the distance between observed and predicted wage di¤erential has been
signicantly reduced in the 3rd specication, implying that the occupational
distribution of native and immigrant workers does matter. Specically, the
inclusion of occupational variables has caused a notable increase in the share
of the estimated wage di¤erentials due to observed characteristics, from 51.0
per cent to 66.1 per cent. This nding provides additional support in favor
of the hypothesis that native-immigrant wage di¤erentials do correlate with
certain occupations.
Insert Table 4 about here
These background results provide su¢ cient motivation for an explicit
analysis of the occupational choices made by immigrants in Greece. One
6Since market wages are observed only for labour market participants but not for non-
participants (whose reservation wage is higher than the o¤ered one), sample selection issues
with respect to participation need to be addressed (Heckman, 1974; Kee, 1995; Shields
and Price, 1998; Blackby, et. al., 2002; Newman and Oaxaca, 2004; Blackby et. al., 2005).
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could reasonably argue that immigrant wages are lower because they work ex-
clusively in the private sector and their vast majority are employed and paid
as unskilled labor. Thus, observed native-immigrant wage di¤erentials may
manifest nothing more than existing inter-occupational wage di¤erentials in
the Greek labor market. Of course, the fact that immigrants are attracted
in certain low-paid occupations and seriously under-represented in high-paid
ones may entail systematic selectivity issues (Constant and Zimmerman 2003;
Newman and Oaxaca, 2004; Liu et al. 2004). In other words, the presence of
statistical discrimination cannot be ruled out (Bruce, 1995; Oettinger, 1996).
Since immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Greece, employers lack
the experience and the capability to judge the qualications of immigrants
and their capacity to meet the demands of jobs with greater potential for
advancement and higher wages (Bruce, 1995). Thus, in the short term, em-
ployers classify immigrants as unskilled laborjust to be on the safe side and
o¤er the goodjobs to natives. In the long term, as more information become
available and the real capabilities of immigrants are made known, employers
have every reason to pursue a more e¢ cient matching of occupations and em-
ployee skills and qualications. However, if an immigrant, at an early stage,
attaches a low probability to the event that he/she will be eventually hired
into a high-paid job, where ability and skill are essential factors, then he/she
has reduced motivation to invest in related skill acquisition. Thus, even in
the long term, this structure of incentives could create a vicious circle that
systematically pushes immigrants into low-paid occupations (Greenwood, et
al., 1996; Gross, 2004; Hammarstedt, 2006; Tasiran and Tezic, 2007).
Indeed, the recent (2005) OECD report on the economic impact of immi-
gration in Greece and the related empirical evidence indicate that immigrant
workers tend to be concentrated in agriculture, household services and con-
struction, performing tasks t mostly to unskilled or low-skilled labor. This
is attributed to the stringent laws of the formal labour market in Greece,
i.e., minimum wages for unskilled workers, and to the substantial size of the
Greek underground economy, which evidently exhibits an insatiable demand
for low-paid labour. The OECD report also asserts that immigration allowed
at least some Greeks to move to higher level jobs. In such a setting, the
intra-occupational wage di¤erentials are not expected to be important, i.e.,
the immigrant native wage di¤erential within the unskilledgroup for ex-
ample is expected to be small or non-existent. Furthermore, the fact that
immigrants are clustered into the unskilledgroup and under-represented
in the skilledone, brings into centre-stage the issue of occupational segre-
gation.
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3 Econometric methodology
The accumulated empirical evidence suggests that occupational choice can-
not be ignored when earnings di¤erentials are investigated. This is because
occupations determine earnings and therefore the existence of discrimination
in occupational choices is directly transformed into discrimination in earn-
ings (Schmidt and Strauss, 1975, Constant and Zimmerman 2003). Brown
et al.1980 suggested an appropriate methodology for assessing inter and
intra-occupation wage e¤ects, by explicitly modelling occupational choice.
This methodology was applied widely in the investigation of gender and race
wage di¤erentials and more recently (Liu et al. 2004) for analyzing native-
immigrant wage di¤erentials in Hong-Kong.
In the present paper we follow closely Browns methodology. We re-coded
the eight occupational categories, available in the GHBS, for two reasons.
First, because certain occupations in the estimating sample are reported
by a very small number of immigrants and second, because some of the
existing occupational categories appear to be perfect or very close substitutes.
This re-coding, which resulted into four broad occupational categories (see
Table 5), facilitates the estimation of occupation-specic wage equations and
ensures that the available alternative choices are more or less distinct, (see
Constant and Zimmerman, 2003).
Following this, wage equations for both, native and immigrant workers
are specied for each of the four occupational categories as follows:
lnwNij = X
N
ij 
N
j + e
N
ij ; j = 1; :::; J (1)
lnwIij = X
I
ij
I
j + e
I
ij; j = 1; :::; J
where, wij is the hourly wage rate for the ith worker in the jth occupation,
Xij is a vector of observed independent correlates that determine occupation-
specic wages, j is the vector of parameters to be estimated and eij is the
error term. The indicators N and I denote natives and immigrants, respec-
tively. Taking into account the proportions of natives and immigrants in each
occupation, PNj and P
I
j , respectively, the sample mean wage di¤erential (Liu
et. al., 2004) becomes:
lnw
N   lnwI =
JX
j=1

PNj lnw
N
j   P Ij lnw
I
j

(2)
The average wage di¤erential is in essence a weighted average of occu-
pational wage di¤erentials, the weights being the proportions of immigrants
and natives in each occupational category. Of course, the occupational dis-
tribution of immigrants may be di¤erent from the distribution of natives,
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for reasons unrelated to their observed characteristics, i.e., discrimination.
In other words, the observed distribution of immigrants in each occupation
needs to be compared with the distribution that would have resulted in the
absence of discrimination. Hence, the estimation of occupation-specic wage
regressions (1) should account for the possible divergence of the observed
from the non-discriminatory occupational structure of immigrants. This in
turn creates the need for an explicit treatment of occupational choice.
Occupational choice is usually approached empirically through a reduced
form multinomial logit model (Brown, et. al., 1980; Green, 1999; Constant
and Zimmerman, 2003; Liu, et al. 2004). The model predicts the probability
that an individual, with known characteristics, will choose a certain occu-
pation from a set of several un-ordered alternative occupations. Thus, the
choice probability Pij of the ith individual for the jth occupation, conditional
on the set of observed individual correlates Zi becomes:
Pij = Pr (y = j j Zi) = e
(jZi)PJ
k=1 e
(jZi)
; j = 1; :::; J (3)
where, k is the vector of coe¢ cients of the set of independent variables Zi,
corresponding to the kth occupation. For identication purposes we impose
the restriction that the vector of the estimated coe¢ cients of the reference oc-
cupation is equal to zero (Greene 2003, p. 721). The model is estimated using
a) the native sub-sample and b) conventional maximum likelihood methods
(MLE). The resulting parameter estimates are unbiased, consistent and as-
ymptotically e¢ cient. The estimated coe¢ cients of the occupational choice
model describe the structure of the labor market under investigation, with
respect to the occupational choices made by native workers. Then, using
the observed characteristics of the immigrant sub-sample we can predict for
every immigrant the probability of choosing a specic occupation, P^ Ij .
If the estimated probabilities of occupational choice P^ Ij di¤er from the ob-
served proportion P Ij then the allocation of immigrants into each occupation
may not be random. If this is the case, then the occupational wage equa-
tions for immigrants and natives should be adjusted for occupation-specic
selectivity bias. The adjustment utilizes information from the estimation of
the occupational choice probabilities of equation (3). Thus, the occupation-
specic wage equation conditional on occupation j being chosen is:
lnwij = Xijj + ^ijj + ij (4)
where, j = j%j, j is the standard deviation of the error term in (4) and
%j is the correlation between the error terms of (4) and (3) and where, ^j =
9
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'[(Zj ^j)]
F(Zj ^j)
, ' [] is the standard normal density function,  () =  1 (F ),  is
the standard normal distribution function and F is the distribution function
of the multinomial logit probabilities dened in (3). Occupational selectivity
bias is controlled for by including ^j in the estimated regression. Equation
(4) is estimated separately for the native and immigrant sub-samples.
Recall that the typical Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, applied in section
2, with occupational dummies included as independent variables, is based
on the assumption that occupational choice is random. However, if the
distribution of immigrants across occupations is shaped by discriminatory
factors and this is ignored then the estimated native-immigrant wage di¤er-
ential will be biased. The legitimacy of the decomposition that is based on
biased estimated wage di¤erentials is also questionable. Thus, the typical
decomposition method of the estimated average wage di¤erential needs to be
augmented, in order to account for the possible presence of occupational se-
lectivity. In this case, the overall average wage di¤erential, as it is described
in (3), can be decomposed into four distinct components as follows:
lnw
N   lnwI = (5)
JX
j=1
P Ij ^
N
j

X
N
j  X
I
j

+
JX
j=1
P Ij X
I
j

^
N
j   ^
I
j

+
JX
j=1
lnw
N
j

PNj   P^ Ij

+
JX
j=1
lnw
N
j

P^Nj   P Ij

The rst and third components account for the explainedpart of the
di¤erential and the second and fourth components for the unexplainedone.
The explainedpart captures the portions of the wage di¤erentials due to
di¤erences in observed characteristics between natives and immigrants. The
unexplained part of the wage di¤erential captures di¤erences in returns
that could be due to discrimination. Furthermore, the rst two components
account for the intra-occupational wage di¤erential and the last two for the
inter-occupational wage di¤erential. Finally, the last component, i.e., inter-
occupational unexplainedpart, provides an indication for the equality of
access between natives and immigrants to various occupations, Liu et al.,
(2004).
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4 Estimation results
With regard to the occupational achievement equation (3), the key explana-
tory variables in Z include potential experience and its squared term7, ed-
ucation, gender and an urban/non-urban dummy8 (e.g., Constant and Zim-
merman, 2003). The results presented in Table 6 are based on the estimation
of the multinomial logit model, using the native sub-sample. The rst two
columns present the actual occupational distribution of natives and immi-
grants. We observe that indeed immigrants are over-represented in the last
two occupation categories (production workersand unskilled labour) and
under-represented in the rst two categories. The third and fourth columns
present the predicted by the model distribution of natives and the predicted
non-discriminatory occupational distribution of immigrants. It can be seen
that the model predicts accurately the distribution of natives, while the re-
sults for the immigrant sub-sample indicate that a signicant occupational
reallocation would have resulted in a non-discriminatory setting. Given their
observed characteristics, immigrants would shift away from the categories
of unskilled labourand production workersand move into the other two
categories. Furthermore, the last three columns of Table 6 indicate that the
di¤erences in observed native-immigrant occupational distributions cannot
be explained by di¤erences in observed characteristics (Z) but rather they
are caused by unobserved factors (unexplained part). The fact that P Ij and
P^ Ij diverge so extensively clearly implies that the labour market in Greece
treats immigrants di¤erently than natives9.
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 7 presents the estimated results of the occupation-specic wage
generating functions, for natives and immigrants, when occupational self-
selection is taken into consideration and corrected for. Overall, the model
ts the data adequately, with R2 values ranging from 0.26 to 0.53. Several
7Data on actual experience are not available and for this reason we use potential
experience, i.e., education-corrected age. We assume also that the ratio of actual to
potentialexperience does not vary across ethnic groups, not an unrealistic assumption
given the ethnic composition of the immigrant labour force (e.g., 73.5% from Eastern
European Countries).
8Due to small-sample restrictions, instead of regional dummies we include an indicator
which identies residence in urban regions (e.g., Gabriel and Schmitz, 1989). The same
indicator is used during the estimation of occupation-specic wage equations.
9Greenwood and McDowel (1982) argue that occupational skills are not perfectly trans-
ferable between countries. However, they conrm that educational background does play
a role and furthermore, immigrants with higher educational attainment may also nd
substantial demand for their skills in the host country.
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points are worth making. The e¤ects of potential experience and its squared
term reveal the existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship (in all occu-
pations but unskilled labour) but this prole is statistically valid only for
the native sub-sample. Educational attainment is important for natives but
only in the service workers and production workers occupations. For
immigrants, tertiary education exerts a positive e¤ect on the wages of pro-
duction workersand a negative one on unskilled labour, when compared
to those that attended only primary school. Married native workers gain
higher wages, with the exception of unskilled labourers, while this relation-
ship could not be conrmed for the immigrant sub-sample. Working in the
previous year a¤ects positively and signicantly wages for both natives and
immigrants across occupations. For the native sub-sample, the impact of
this variable is very important for service and unskilled workers, implying
that persistenceacts as experiencethat generates higher current returns.
This e¤ect is also consistent across occupations regarding the immigrant sub-
sample of workers. Working in the private sector, negatively a¤ects native
wages, while the same does not seem to hold for immigrants, with the ex-
ception of service workers. Holders of temporary work contracts, natives and
immigrants, seem to receive lower wages (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005), while
part-timers appear to enjoy higher hourly wages.
Insert Table 7 about here
In addition, the occupational selectivity parameter ^j is statistically sig-
nicant in ve out of eight wage regressions. Specically, occupational self-
selection is present for the immigrant sub-sample in all but the rst occu-
pational category. Furthermore, the identied selectivity exerts a positive
e¤ect on the immigrant wage of service workersand unskilled labourand
a negative one on production workers. This clearly implies that the choice
of these occupations by immigrants is not random. The selectivity parameter
for the native sub-sample is statistically signicant in the service workers
and production workersoccupations. Its e¤ect is positive in the rst case
and negative in the second one. This nding implies that the unobserved
factors that push natives into various occupations correlate negatively or
positively with their wages. The di¤erentiated e¤ects of occupational selec-
tivity, among occupations and between natives and immigrants, which are
observed in the present study, were also identied in the related international
literature (e.g. Liu et al., 2004).
Insert Table 8 about here
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The upper part of Table 8 presents the mean values of the variables
in the X matrix, for natives and immigrants, which were employed for the
estimation of the occupation-specic wage generating equations, (presented
at Table 7). Using these values together with the estimated ^
N
j , ^
I
j (Table 7)
and P Ij ; P^
I
j ; P
N
j ; P^
N
j (Table 6), we can proceed with the four-way decompo-
sition of the average native-immigrant wage di¤erential as described in (5).
The results appear at the lower part of Table 8. First, recall that the average
(ln)wage di¤erential between natives and immigrants comes to 0.335. Sec-
ond, the decomposition shows that 51.9 per cent of this di¤erential can be
attributed to endowment di¤erences between natives and immigrants, i.e.,
observed correlates, while the remaining 48.1 per cent is unexplained. Third,
the explained part, i.e., 51.9, is primarily attributed to within- occupations
endowment di¤erences (46.3 points) and to a much lesser extent to between-
occupations di¤erences (5.7 points). Fourth, the unexplained part, i.e., 48.1,
concerns primarily between-occupations di¤erences (43.3 points) and sub-
stantially less within-occupations di¤erences (4.8 points). In other words, we
could conclude that the unexplained part of the observed native-immigrant
wage di¤erential relates primarily to inter-occupational unobserved factors
rather than to intra-occupational ones. This nding may in turn imply that
immigrants, unlike natives, face di¢ culties in gaining access to certain oc-
cupations. That is, if we assume that the observed wage di¤erentials reveal
discrimination, then this discrimination relates primarily to unequal occupa-
tional access between Greek and foreign-born workers rather than unequal
treatment within a given occupation. In other words, once an immigrant
gains access to a certain occupation then the issue of discrimination, as far
as earning di¤erentials are concerned, becomes relatively unimportant.
5 Summary and policy implications
In this paper we investigated, for the rst time, native-immigrant wage dif-
ferentials in the Greek labour market. We have employed the most recent
GHBS (2004-05) data base, we considered four alternative occupations and
we explicitly accounted for occupational selectivity. Occupational choice was
approached through a multinomial logit model. Controlling for the usual
individual and job-related characteristics and for occupational selectivity, we
estimated occupation-specic wage equations for representative samples of
employed native and immigrant workers. Following this, an augmented de-
composition technique was utilised in order to allocate unexplained native-
immigrant wage di¤erentials to within- and between-occupations unobserved
factors.
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Our results demonstrate that native workers enjoy signicantly higher
wages than immigrants and that this di¤erential is to a large extent, around
48 per cent, unexplained by di¤erences in observed characteristics of the
two worker-groups. Furthermore, the decomposition analysis reveals that
roughly 90 per cent of the unexplained part can be attributed to between-
occupations di¤erences and 10 per cent to within-occupations ones. This
nding implies in turn that the underlying cause of observed wage di¤eren-
tials is the asymmetrical occupational access of natives and immigrants and
not their unequal treatment within a given occupation. Indeed, it is found
that immigrants are over-represented in low-paid jobs (production workers
and unskilled labour) and under-represented in high-paid ones (legislators,
managers, professi nals, assistants and service workers). Moreover, the uti-
lized occupational-choice model predicts that large numbers of immigrants
will move out of low-paid jobs and into high-paid ones, in a labour market
setting that would provide equal occupational access and opportunities.
The obtained results could be helpful in formulating a more appropriate
immigration policy, aiming at a smoother assimilation of immigrants into
the Greek economy. Closing of the native-immigrant wage di¤erential, i.e.,
a major aspect of assimilation, requires policies that will address two major
issues: a) the asymmetrical occupational access of natives and immigrants
and b) the within-occupations wage di¤erentials. The results of the present
study indicate that (a) is much more important than (b). In other words,
the under-representation of immigrants in high- skilled and paid occupations
is the result of systematic factors rather than random ones and indicates
the existence of invisible barriers (glass ceiling) that prevent them from
moving into high-wage occupations. Thus, policies need to be designed to
improve the access of immigrants to high-paid jobs in the public and private
sectors of the Greek labour market. For example, hiring quotas for quali-
fying immigrants in the public sector need to be considered. Similarly, an
active labour market policy that assists employers to achieve better match-
ing between job requirements and employee skills and qualications could
also improve access to high-paid jobs by immigrants. It is evident that if
technical and professional skills of immigrants are ignored then Greece is not
using e¢ ciently its available workforce. On the other hand, continuous on-
the-job training, specic and general, of immigrants could also be helpful in
alleviating within-occupation native-immigrant wage di¤erentials.
The results of the background analysis (Section 2) revealed the presence
of selectivity with respect to labour market participation. Selectivity im-
plies that the native immigrant wage-o¤erdi¤erential is larger than the
observed wage di¤erential, (Reimers, 1983; Blau and Beller, 1988; Miller,
1987; Kee, 1995). In other words, if currently non-participating natives were
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to become participants then the immigrant-native earnings di¤erential would
have been larger, ceteris-paribus. Thus, the simultaneous treatment of par-
ticipation and occupational selectivity, along perhaps the lines suggested by
Dolton et. al., (1989), seems like a natural extension of the present study.
This is certainly a more meaningful exercise for female workers, native and
immigrant, who exhibit signicantly lower participation rates than males.
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Figure 1. Densities of observed (ln) hourly wages for native Greeks and two immigrant groups 
(Eastern European countries and all other countries) 
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Table 1. Ethnic composition of immigrants in Greece
% of total % of total
population immigrant population
EU-151 0.6 8.2
EEC2 5.7 73.5
AAME3 0.9 11.1
OC4 0.6 7.2
Total Immigrants 7.8 100
Native Greeks 92.2 -
TOTAL population 100 -
1 European Union-15, 2 Former Communists Eastern
European Countries, 3 Asia, Africa and the Middle East,
4 Americas and Oceania
Source: Own calculations, GHBS, 2004-2005
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Table 2. Employment status of immigrants and natives, [18-64] age bracket
EU-15 1 EEC 2 AAE3 OC 4 Native Sample
Greeks averages
Total Sample
Employed 59.55 70.94 70.69 60.52 60.97 61.79
Unemployed 8.99 5.71 4.31 2.63 5.73 5.72
Retired 3.37 1.17 3.45 1.32 7.37 6.79
Inactive1a 28.09 22.18 21.55 35.53 25.93 25.7
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Men
Employed 81.82 87.43 86.77 70.37 75.03 76.09
Unemployed 15.15 6.83 4.41 3.7 5.21 5.37
Retired 0 1.37 2.94 0 9.1 8.36
Inactive1a 3.03 4.37 5.88 25.93 10.66 10.18
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
Women
Employed 46.42 56.05 47.91 55.1 47.61 48.29
Unemployed 5.36 4.69 4.17 2.04 6.23 6.05
Retired 5.36 0.99 4.17 2.04 5.71 5.31
Inactive1a 42.86 38.27 43.75 40.82 40.45 40.35
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
1a pupils, students, soldiers, housewives, incapacitated,
1European Union-15, 2 Former Communists Eastern European Countries,
3 Asia, Africa and the Middle East
Source: Own calculations, GHBS, 2004-2005
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Table 3. Denition of variables and descriptives (employedsub-sample)
Variabe Denition Total Natives Immigrants
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Wage Hourly wage rate in e 5.36 1.91 5.66 1.90 4.04 1.78
Age Age in years 38.73 10.56 38.97 10.55 37.46 10.50
Exper Potential experience (Age-yrs in educ) 27.28 11.21 27.45 11.33 26.40 10.51
Secondary 1 if secondary education, 0 otherwise 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.49 0.67 0.46
Tertiary 1 if tertiary education, 0 otherwise 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39
Female 1 if sex is female 0.41 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.40 0.49
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.61 0.48 0.60 0.48 0.66 0.47
Hsize Household size 3.39 1.21 3.39 1.20 3.40 1.24
Emplt-1 1 if employed last year, 0 otherwise 0.87 0.33 0.88 0.31 0.79 0.40
Part-time 1 if employed on a part-time basis, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.24
Private 1 if employed in the private sector, 0 otherwise 0.66 0.47 0.62 0.48 0.87 0.33
Uninsured 1 if uninsured, 0 otherwise 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.09 0.29
Tempcont 1 if employed on a temporary contract, 0 otherwise 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.28 0.45
Occupations (dummies)
Legislators, Managers, Administrators, Senior O¢ cials 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.06
Professionals 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.19
Associate professionals 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.15
Clerks 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.21
Service and shop-sales workers 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37
Skilled agricuture and shery workers 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10
Craft and related workers 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.32 0.46
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.20
Unskilled labour 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27 0.34 0.47
Number of observations 4274 3580 694
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Table 4. Estimated e¤ects of immigrant status on (ln)wages
and decompositionof the estimated native-immigrant
wage di¤erentials
(1) (2) (3)
coef. coef. coef.
Immigrant status -0.155 -0.124 -0.076
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Selectivity term -0.271 -0.137 -0.139
(0.061) (0.058) (0.056)
Oaxaca-type wage decomposition
Raw di¤erential 0.335 0.335 0.335
Predicted di¤erential 0.483 0.392 0.366
Due to endowments 0.204 0.201 0.242
% Due to endowments 0.422 0.511 0.661
Due to discrimination 0.279 0.192 0.124
% Due to discrimination 0.578 0.493 0.339
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Wage regressions
corrected for sample selection. Exogenous variables included in
Specication (1): exper, exper-squared, secondary, tertiary,
female, married, hsize, emplt-1, private, tempcont, uninsured,
part-time, in Specication (2): as in (1) plus 12 regional
and 16 sectoral dummies, in Specication (3): as in (2)
plus 8 occupational dummies.
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Table 5. Occupational categories
Categories Coding Occupation in GHBS
Highly skilled 1 Legislators, Managers, Administrators,
Senior O¢ cials, Professionals,
Associate Professionals
Service workers 2 Clerks, Service and Shop-sales workers
Production workers 3 Skilled agriculture and shery workers,
Craft and related workers,
Plant and machine operators
and assemblers
Unskilled labour 4 Unskilled labour
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Table 6. Actual and predicted probabilities of occupational attainment
by native (N) and immigrant (I) workers
Observed Predicted Observed Explained Unexplained
distribution distribution di¤erence di¤erence di¤erence
N I N I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (1)-(4) (4)-(2)
Highly skilled 0.238 0.065 0.238 0.198 0.173 0.04 0.133
Service workers 0.442 0.215 0.442 0.478 0.227 -0.036 0.263
Production workers 0.234 0.377 0.234 0.245 -0.143 -0.011 -0.131
Unskilled labour 0.086 0.343 0.086 0.079 -0.257 0.007 -0.264
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Table 7. Estimated wage equations corrected for occupational self-selection:
natives (N) and immigrants (I)
Highly Skilled Service workers Production workers Unskilled labour
N I N I N I N I
Intercept 1.031 5.235 0.161 0.508 0.694*** 0.85*** 0.179 0.710*
(1.222) (6.558) (0.119) (0.315) (0.148) (0.210) (0.353) (0.442)
Exper 0.040*** 0.027 0.027*** 0.025 0.028*** 0.026** 0.027 -0.010
(0.011) (0.074) (0.005) (0.020) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.028)
Exper-squared -0.0005*** -0.0005 -0.0003*** -0.0004 -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0003 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Secondary -0.096 -0.999 0.293*** 0.106 0.221*** 0.095 0.011 -0.111
(0.352) (1.879) (0.059) (0.201) (0.040) (0.073) (0.093) (0.101)
Tertiary 0.080 -3.462 0.345*** 0.196 0.661*** 0.371** -1.336 -0.399***
(0.837) (4.395) (0.058) (0.177) (0.094) (0.172) (1.046 (0.139)
Married 0.139*** -0.004 0.085*** -0.050 0.179*** 0.153* -0.009 -0.002
(0.045) (0.289) (0.026) (0.085) (0.038) (0.056) 0.071 (0.086)
Hsize 0.118 0.169* -0.051* -0.051* -0.022* 0.017 0.032 0.031
(0.013) (0.101) (0.008) (0.029) (0.013) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028)
Empl. t-1 0.607*** 0.500* 0.845*** 0.762*** 0.742*** 0.525*** 0.809*** 0.690***
(0.113) (0.258) (0.068) (0.143) (0.076) (0.082) (0.129) (0.119)
Private -0.167*** -0.111 -0.276*** -0.413*** -0.232*** -0.137 -0.236*** 0.022
(0.036) (0.164) (0.023) (0.129) (0.028) (0.137) (0.068) (0.166)
Temp. contract -0.151** -0.338* -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.136*** -0.118*** -0.263*** -0.075
(0.076) (0.187) (0.044) (0.087) (0.049) (0.062) (0.097) (0.096)
Uninsured -0.443* -0.0001 -0.120 -0.275** -0.622*** -0.055 -0.117*** -0.038
(0.237) (0.187) (0.158) (0.135) (0.249) (0.010) (0.245) (0.115)
Part-time 0.217** -0.196 0.391*** 0.577*** 0.294*** 0.424** 0.725*** 0.373***
(0.112) (0.681) (0.077) (0.145) (0.104) (0.199) (0.137) (0.122)
Urban -0.053 0.514* 0.050* 0.200* 0.121*** 0.267*** 0.079 -0.019
(0.068) (0.240) (0.030) (0.105) (0.033) (0.096) (0.074) (0.088)
 -0.105 -1.991 0.193*** 0.260** -0.325*** -0.375*** 0.020 0.011***
(0.415) (2.146) (0.046) (0.119) (0.052) (0.108) (0.013) (0.003)
F-test 45.09*** 6.82*** 80.80*** 8.33*** 30.74*** 6.29*** 9.87*** 4.98***
R-squared 42.8 53.2 50.2 49.1 51.7 39.2 39.2 26.1
Observations 837 45 1551 149 822 261 302 238
 is the occupational selectivity term as described in the text.
Asteriscs denote statistical signicance at, ***1%, **5% and *10%
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Table 8. Occupation-specic average observed characteristics and occupational native
(N)-immigrant (I) wage di¤erential decomposition
Highly Skilled Service workers Production workers Unskilled labour
N I N I N I N I
Hourly wage (in e) 2.153 2.002 1.64 1.367 1.588 1.482 1.387 1.209
Exper 26.122 26.178 25.61 23.752 30.428 25.808 34.119 28.777
Exper-squared 777.259 771.244 769.662 661.51 1075.443 773.962 1311.417 944.055
Secondary 0.235 0.212 0.718 0.752 0.633 0.736 0.401 0.651
Tertiary 0.749 0.756 0.191 0.221 0.047 0.111 0.007 0.155
Married 0.659 0.556 0.549 0.631 0.646 0.671 0.616 0.693
Household size 3.268 3.244 3.34 3.188 3.578 3.575 3.513 3.395
Emplt-1 0.918 0.822 0.899 0.812 0.866 0.801 0.791 0.782
Private 0.407 0.612 0.648 0.846 0.814 0.904 0.682 0.92
Tempcont 0.122 0.222 0.147 0.154 0.176 0.241 0.351 0.42
Uninsured 0.008 0.000 0.019 0.074 0.018 0.061 0.043 0.176
Part-time 0.049 0.067 0.058 0.04 0.034 0.023 0.142 0.122
Urban 0.871 0.844 0.814 0.893 0.685 0.862 0.666 0.811
 0.864 0.884 0.767 0.744 0.989 1.110 3.075 7.069
Expressed Expressed
in logs as % of the (WD)
Within-occupations di¤ential
Endowments1 0.155 46.3
Unexplained2 0.016 4.8
Total 0.171
Between-occupations di¤ential
Endowments3 0.019 5.7
Unexplained4 0.145 43.3
Total 0.164
Total explained5 0.174 51.9
Total unexplained6 0.161 48.1
Observed wage di¤erential (WD) 0.335 100
 is the occupational selectivity term as described in the text.
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